World Interoperable Trust Organization

Economic trust infrastructure

Definition

Our economies depend on claims about physical and digital objects that cannot be established by inspection. The systems and arrangements that allow an unrelated party to rely on that verification constitute infrastructure in the same sense as a port or a payment system. The identifiers, credentials, traceability systems, certificates, accreditation, and mutual-recognition arrangements that allow one party to rely on another's claim are economic trust infrastructure.

Trust in identity is named, studied, and institutionally supported. Trust in money is likewise. Trust in objects possesses the same machinery without the same framing.

The cost of unverifiable claims

Failures in the trustworthiness of information tied to objects impose massive costs on the world economy. The World Health Organization estimates that at least one in ten medical products circulating in low- and middle-income countries is substandard or falsified, and that spending on such products runs to approximately USD 30.5 billion each year (WHO, 2024). The consequence is not only wasted expenditure. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime attributes as many as 267,000 deaths a year in sub-Saharan Africa to falsified and substandard antimalarial medicines, and up to a further 169,271 to falsified and substandard antibiotics used to treat severe pneumonia in children (UNODC, 2023).

Traded goods show losses of comparable scale. The OECD and the EU Intellectual Property Office estimate global trade in counterfeit and pirated goods at approximately USD 467 billion in 2021, or 2.3 percent of global imports (OECD and EUIPO, 2025).

Estimates for food fraud are also striking. The United States Food and Drug Administration reports outside expert estimates of USD 10 to 15 billion a year, with some more recent estimates as high as USD 40 billion, and states that the frequency and exact economic impact are hard to establish because food fraud is designed to avoid detection (FDA, 2026).

Counterfeit wine, 2004 to 2012. Rudy Kurniawan blended inexpensive wines to imitate rare vintages and sold them through leading auction houses to expert collectors who did not detect the substitution. Ordered to forfeit USD 20 million and pay more than USD 28 million in restitution.

US Department of Justice, 2014

Contaminated cough syrups, 2022 to 2023. Syrups adulterated with industrial solvents killed more than 300 children across the Gambia, Indonesia, Uzbekistan, and other countries. The World Health Organization issued three alerts to all 194 member states and described the incidents as systemic.

WHO, 2023

Falsified aircraft engine parts, 2023. A distributor supplied approximately 60,000 engine parts with forged airworthiness certificates. The fraud surfaced only when one engineer asked the manufacturer to confirm a part's origin.

Aerospace Global News, 2026

Horsemeat in the European beef supply, 2013. Horsemeat was found in products labelled as beef across at least 15 EU member states. The passport system intended to track the animals proved open to abuse.

European Parliament, 2013

The economic trust stack

The global economic trust infrastructure is made up of standards, specifications, laws, and other instruments, created by hundreds of organisations. These instruments range from the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model, which sets out how a digital claim is expressed, to ISO/IEC 17065, which sets the requirements a body must meet to certify a product, and from the ICAO passport specification honoured at borders worldwide to Regulation (EU) 2023/1542, which makes a battery passport mandatory in the European Union from February 2027.

Classified by function, these instruments constitute the economic trust stack, a ladder of seven layers running from the identifiers that name an object to the regulation that compels its verification. Each layer relies on those beneath it.

The economic trust stack: what each layer does, and what it depends on Seven horizontal bands forming a ladder. From the base upward: identifiers, which name the object; data and credential models, which express a claim; traceability and exchange protocols, which move records along a supply chain; conformity assessment and certification, which test, inspect and certify; accreditation, which establishes that verifiers are competent; governance and mutual recognition, the arrangements by which one system accepts another; and mandating regulation, the law that compels verification. Each layer depends on those beneath it. Shading indicates position in the ladder. 07 Mandating regulation Law that compels verification 06 Governance and mutual recognition Arrangements by which one system accepts another 05 Accreditation Establishing that verifiers are competent 04 Conformity assessment and certification Testing, inspection, and certification 03 Traceability and exchange protocols Moving records along a supply chain 02 Data and credential models How a claim is expressed 01 Identifiers Naming the object builds on the layer below Shading indicates position in the ladder. SOURCE · THE ECONOMIC TRUST LANDSCAPE, 2026
The seven functional layers of the economic trust stack.
LayerNameFunction
07Mandating regulationLaw that compels verification
06Governance and mutual recognitionArrangements by which one system accepts another
05AccreditationEstablishing that verifiers are competent
04Conformity assessment and certificationTesting, inspection, and certification
03Traceability and exchange protocolsMoving records along a supply chain
02Data and credential modelsHow a claim is expressed
01IdentifiersNaming the object

Where improvement is possible

Interconnection and mutual recognition between the different instruments that make up the world's economic trust infrastructure is a public good, helping to improve the overall system. But, as a public good, this interconnection is underprovided when left to market forces alone. WITO seeks to fill this gap.

Examples where WITO, in collaboration with stakeholders, can build greater beneficial interoperability and mutual recognition are outlined below.

Allowing one examination to serve in many places

An organisation selling into several different markets must satisfy several different standards for the same claim. Recognition between these different standards would let one examination be relied upon in more than one place. The gain is largest for smaller organisations.

Every major market mandates its own system to serialise and trace medicine, all using the same barcode and none accepting another's records. Customs shows the alternative: under the WCO SAFE Framework, national authorities vet companies and then accept one another's vetting, through 92 operational programmes and 132 concluded arrangements.

WCO, August 2026

Extending recognition to where authority is greatest

Mutual recognition is least common among instruments that are authored by governments and legally binding. Often, these standards, regulations, or systems are built for a single legal order. Systems that enable mutual recognition across governments can create meaningful efficiencies.

India's Aadhaar and Singapore's Singpass cannot establish identity in the other jurisdiction. A passport is more sovereign still and is trusted at almost any border, because ICAO maintains one specification and a shared Public Key Directory. More than 140 states and entities issue ePassports; 111 take part in the directory.

ICAO, August 2026

Strengthening the connective layer

There are a relatively small number of instruments that promote interoperability and mutual recognition. Furthermore, this small number of instruments are distributed across many owners. A non-commercial body with no stake in which participant is recognised can serve an important role in coordinating greater connection.

Codex Alimentarius. Food safety shows what a benchmark held in common can do. The Codex Alimentarius Commission publishes international standards covering food additives, veterinary drug and pesticide residues, contaminants, methods of analysis and sampling, and codes of hygienic practice.

Annex A of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures names those standards as the international reference for food safety, and Article 3.2 attaches a consequence to them: a national measure that conforms to them is "deemed to be necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and presumed to be consistent" with the Agreement and with GATT 1994.

A regulator adopting Codex therefore begins from a presumption of compliance rather than having to justify its measure from first principles, and an exporter that meets Codex knows what every member is measuring against. The benchmark is owned by no one country, which is what allows every country to rely on it.

WTO, SPS Agreement Article 3.2 and Annex A paragraph 3

Enabling trust to travel between domains

In many instances, a product's identifier, its conformity certificate, and its verified sustainability claim cannot yet travel together as one trusted record.

Before 2018 a UK bank customer's account history sat inside each bank's systems. Under Open Banking, authorised providers can read data or initiate payments with the customer's consent, so the data follows the person. By March 2025 there were 13.3 million active users served by 145 providers.

Open Banking Limited, 2025

Designing recognition to be inclusive

A threshold set without care excludes smaller producers and lower-capacity economies. Designing recognition to admit them is a deliberate act, and a test WITO's own arrangements seeks to meet.

A Dominican cocoa cooperative holds roughly eight certifications at once because the schemes do not accept one another. In food safety, the Global Food Safety Initiative benchmarks existing schemes and recognises those meeting a common threshold, ending duplication without collapsing into a single standard.

ConfectioneryNews, 2023; GFSI

To learn more about economic trust infrastructure and where improvements are possible, see our publications.